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Resumo: Este quarto artigo de uma série de seis que correlacionam a filosofia kantiana e o  Yijing 
começa por resumir os artigos precedentes: Ambos Kant e os 64 hexagramas (gua) do Yijing empregam 
uma argumentação “arquitetônica” para formar um sistema de quatro graus com 0+4+12+(4x12) 
elementos, o quarto grau de quatro conjuntos d doze, correlacionando-se ao modelo kantiano das 
quatro “faculdades” universais. Este artigo explora o segundo do duodécuplo conjunto, a faculdade da 
lei. A “ideia da razão” a guiar esta asa da análise comparativa é a imortalidade. Três das “quaternidades” 
correspondem a três conjuntos de quatro gua no Yijing: a quarta parte da natureza da alma na 
psicologia racional (como substancial, simples, unificada, espacialmente relacionada) corresponde aos 
gua 47, 6, 58, 10, respectivamente; os três “Artigos Definitivos” e o quarto, “Artigo Secreto”, na Para 
a Paz Perpétua correspondem aos gua 16, 5, 51, 21; e as quatro relações objetivas da lei do dever na 
Metafísica dos Costumes correspondem aos gua 25, 12, 17, 25.
Palavras-chave: Immanuel Kant; Yijing; livro das mutações; filosofia política; psicologia racional; 
argumentações arquitetônicas; imortalidade da alma; paz; dever.
Abstract: This fourth article in a six-part series correlating Kant’s philosophy with the Yijing begins 
by summarizing the foregoing articles: both Kant and the Yijing’s 64 hexagrams (gua) employ 
“architectonic” reasoning to form a four-level system with 0+4+12+(4x12) elements, the fourth level’s 
four sets of 12 correlating to Kant’s model of four university “faculties”. This article explores the second 
twelvefold set, the law faculty. The “idea of reason” guiding this wing of the comparative analysis is 
immortality. Three of Kant’s “quaternities” correspond to three sets of four gua in the Yijing: the fourfold 
nature of the soul in rational psychology (as substantial, simple, unified, spatially related) corresponds to 
gua 47, 6, 58, 10, respectively; the three “Definitive Articles” and fourth, “Secret Article”, in Perpetual 
Peace correspond to gua 16, 35,51, 21; and the four objective relations of law to duty in Metaphysics of 
Morals correspond to gua 45, 12, 17, 25.
Keywords: Immanuel Kant; Yijing; book of changes; political philosophy; rational psychology; 
architectonic reasoning; immortality of the soul; peace; duty.
1  Biographical sketch: Stephen R. Palmquist is Professor of Religion and Philosophy at Hong Kong Baptist University, 
where he has taught since earning his doctorate (Oxford University, 1987). Most of his 150+ publications (including ten 
books, and articles in numerous top-ranked journals) focus on various aspects of Kant’s philosophy. His most recent book 
is A Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion with the Bounds of Bare Reason (Wiley, 2014). The present article forms 
part of a new book project, tentatively entitled Changing the Changeless.
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Mapping Kant’s Changeless Architectonic onto the Yijing’s Patterned Changes
Few philosophers in either the East or the West would think of the Yijing — the ancient 
Chinese classic, whose title can be translated as Book of Changes, most often used as a manual for 
fortune-telling — as a potential source of dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophy, 
especially the changeless, a priori theories defended in the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804). Nevertheless, if we focus on the form of these two systems of thought, rather 
than being preoccupied with their content or the way the two systems are typically applied, a striking 
similarity emerges. Both systems employ a rigid, mathematically-generated structure to determine 
the basic conceptual relationships that “count” as relevant. Whereas the Yijing consists of all possible 
variations of a six-line figure, each line being either solid (—) or broken (- -), and thus generates a 
total of 64 “hexagrams” or “gua” (26=64), Kant’s infamous Table of Categories consists of two twofold 
distinctions (2x2=4), each being further broken down into a threefold synthesis (+, -, x), and thus 
generates a total of 12 “moments” (4x3=12).
Having previously argued that Kant’s Table of Categories provides the structure for what he 
calls the “architectonic” unity of his system, I limited my first attempt to compare Kant and the Yijing 
to the bare fact that both systems employ this same type of reasoning.2 The first article introduced 
Kant’s method of architectonic reasoning, whereby predetermined distinctions are read into a given 
subject-matter, as its changeless (a priori) structure, as opposed to Aristotle’s “aggregate” reasoning, 
whereby an object’s characteristics are read off of the empirical world, a posteriori; it then defended 
the general claim that the Yijing uses the same reasoning method as Kant, whereby the interpreter 
reads one or more of the (fixed) 64 gua into the never-ending “changes” of human experience. In short, 
Aristotle’s method begins by observing objects of the type one wishes to understand and attempts 
to draw general conclusions about them, while the Kantian/Yijing method imposes a predetermined 
structure onto the object, creating a meaning that the object would not have, if we did not put it there.
When I first noticed the interesting fact that each of these two systems depends on a pre-
established mathematical structure, I assumed the two structures were incommensurable, because the 
Yijing contains no threefold distinctions, yet threefold synthesis is essential to many of Kant’s systematic 
distinctions. However, as I was preparing a revised version of the first article (Palmquist 2010, revised 
in 2011), I came across an intriguing article (Hershock 2009), whose appendix proposes several non-
standard ways of arranging the 64 gua. One of the alternatives, though not discussed at any length in 
that article, arranges the 64 gua in a way that involves the conspicuous occurrence of several patterns of 
12 (=3x4). After developing a slightly revised version of that arrangement, I therefore wrote a second 
article (Palmquist 2012b), introducing what I named “the Compound Yijing”: an arrangement of the 
Yijing’s 64 gua into four “levels”, exhibiting a 0+4+12+(4x12)=64 pattern that can be “mapped” onto a 
previously-defended logical apparatus that I call the “Geometry of Logic” (see Figure 1):
2  See Palmquist 2010. For my previous argument regarding the role of Kant’s categories in his own understanding of “ar-
chitectonic”, see Palmquist 2000a, Appendix II. 
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The second article provided a detailed explanation and defense of how the first  three levels 
of the Compound Yijing correlate with parallel aspects of Kant’s philosophy. In short, the first level 
(“0”) refers to the paradoxically foundational-yet-empty role played by the “dao” in ancient Chinese 
philosophy and by the “thing in itself ” in Kant’s system: in both cases, nothing literally true can be said 
of the reality being named, yet that reality informs and perhaps even creates all knowable objects.3 The 
second level consists of Kant’s four basic category headings (quantity, quality, relation, and modality), 
which can be mapped directly onto a cross that exhibits the same formal structure as the second level 
of the Yijing, consisting of gua 2, 64, 63, and 1, respectively. On the third level, Kant’s twelve categories 
(arranged in four sets of three) correspond to and share suggestive resonances with twelve gua that 
are derived from the initial four using several simple rules of mapping. The article concluded with a 
hypothetical sketch of how correlations might look on the fourth level, as follows. If the same mapping 
3   I have also explored this first parallel in Palmquist 2013. 
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rules are used to arrange the remaining 48 gua into four sets of 12 (in a 3x4 pattern), then each set of 
12 might end up exhibiting some significant correspondence to one of the four “faculties” in Kant’s 
model of the university: philosophy as the “lower” faculty, followed by law, medicine, and theology as 
the three “higher” faculties, correspond to the four quadrants of the Compound Yijing, headed by gua 
2 (yin-yin), 64 (yang-yin), 63 (yin-yang), and 1 (yang-yang), respectively.
My prediction in the final section of the second article paved the way for four additional articles, 
each exploring the extent to which one of the 12-fold patterns on the fourth level of the Compound Yijing 
correlates with three fourfold (categorial) tables presented by Kant in the corresponding wing of his 
philosophical system. The third article (Palmquist 2014) carried out the first of these four experiments, 
by relating three often neglected tables, one from each of Kant’s three Critiques, to what I have labeled 
the “philosophy” wing of the Compound Yijing. The experiment was surprisingly successful: Kant’s 
table of the four perspectives on “nothing” correlated well with the quaternity consisting of gua 8, 20, 
3, and 42; his table of the four categories of freedom correlated with gua 7, 4, 19, and 41; and his table 
of the four moments in a judgment of taste correlated with gua 29, 59, 60, and 61.
While the first two articles in this series argued that Kant and the Yijing both share an 
architectonic approach to philosophy, the third article highlighted a key difference between these two 
ways of interpreting human experience. Kant’s philosophy is transcendental, meaning that the truths 
generated by his architectonic system are synthetic (i.e., true because of their factual applicability to 
the world), yet their truth-status is a priori (i.e., its justification will not require an appeal to specific 
experiences). By contrast, the Yijing’s form of architectonic reasoning is hypothetical: its truth-claims 
that are both analytic (i.e., true by virtue of the stipulated meanings we give to the relevant words) and 
a posteriori (i.e., its justification will require an appeal to specific experiences).4 Thus, while the focus 
of Kant’s architectonic method is to produce synthetic a priori knowledge (i.e., it has a transcendental 
aim: discovering the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience), the focus of the Yijing’s 
architectonic method is to produce analytic a posteriori belief (i.e., it has a hypothetical aim: naming an 
ideal set of conditions that are in themselves contingent, but that — taken together — symbolically 
represent all possible types of experience). The third article then demonstrated that, by taking this radical 
difference into consideration, Kant’s system and the Yijing’s system do indeed share a commitment to 
architectonic reasoning that gives rise to numerous interesting correlations.
The remaining three sections of this fourth article in the series follow the strategy adopted in 
the third article: having selected three sets of fourfold distinctions that Kant employs in defending 
his philosophy of law, I shall relate these in turn to the three quaternities shown in the yang-yin (+-) 
quadrant of Figure 1.5 Figure 2 highlights the derivation of this quadrant from the first three levels 
of the Compound Yijing. In preparation for this second step in the experiment of comparing Kant’s 
philosophy with the fourth level of the Compound Yijing, let us recall that for Kant the purpose of 
the law faculty is to train lawyers to protect people’s property rights, both during life and after death. 
4  For a detailed account of these distinctions, see Chapter IV of Palmquist 1993. For the most up-to-date discussion of this 
rarely-discussed option, see Palmquist 2012a.
5  As explained in the second and third articles in this series (Palmquist 2012b and 2014), the names for each quadrant 
(in Figure 1) are taken from the two middle lines that remain unchanged throughout all the gua in that quadrant. So, the 
“yang-yin quadrant” consists of the 16 gua that have a solid line and a broken line in their fourth and third positions 
(counting from the bottom), respectively.
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Of Kant’s three “ideas of reason”, as we shall see, this task corresponds to immortality. In §2 I shall 
examine the extent to which the main quaternity proposed in the corresponding area of traditional 
rationalist metaphysics (i.e., in rational psychology) — the distinction between the four features of 
the soul, as substantial, simple, unified, and related to spatial objects6 — corresponds to the Yijing’s 
quaternity consisting of gua 47, 6, 58, and 10. In §3 I shall then examine how far the opposite quaternity, 
consisting of gua 16, 35, 51, and 21, can be taken as corresponding to Kant’s vision of the ultimate 
political situation in Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); here I shall identify Kant’s fourfold distinction as 
consisting of the three “Definitive Articles,” with the “Secret Article” serving as the fourth component 
(PP 349,354,357,368). Finally, §4 will explore the possibility of relating the synthetic quaternity, 
consisting of gua 45, 12, 17, and 25, to the division introduced in the Doctrine of Right (the first part 
of the Metaphysics of Morals), between the four ways of relating law to duty objectively (MM 240-241).7 
A thorough study of each of these proposed correlations would require an article of its own, so my 
goal here will be merely to illustrate the above-mentioned similarity-in-difference by observing some 
initial correlations that arise within each quaternity.
6  Kant 1781/1787 presents this fourfold distinction in tabular form in A341-405/B399-432.
7    In preparing this article I recognized that the correlations I predicted for this quadrant in Palmquist 2012b inverted the 
proper order of the quaternities presented in Perpetual Peace and Metaphysics of Morals. In each of Kant’s triadic relations, 
the ideal component typically comes second; indeed, in this case, Kant wrote these two books in the same order as their 
logical (architectonic) relationship suggests. This article therefore follows that (correct) order, with the result that the 
correlations fit much more appropriately than if I had forced them into the originally-predicted order.
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The first yang-yin quaternity: the four subjective features of the immortal soul
Kant’s theory of the fourfold nature of the soul might seem at first to be completely unrelated 
to his philosophy of law; nevertheless, a careful examination of the structure of his architectonic reveals 
that the two are closely related. The three main chapters of the Transcendental Dialectic of the first 
Critique — the Paralogisms, the Antinomy, and the Ideal — correspond to the rational “ideas” of 
immortality (of the soul), freedom (from empirical causality), and God, respectively. As I have argued 
in Kant’s System of Perspectives (see especially §X.1), these ideas, in turn, correlate with the three main 
areas of Kant’s metaphysical concern (as also reflected in his theory of the “higher faculties” of the 
ideal university): politics (cf. the faculty of law), science (cf. the faculty of medicine), and religion (cf. the 
faculty of theology), respectively. Given these architectonic correlations, the obvious place to look for a 
correlate to the first quaternity of the Compound Yijing’s yang-yin quadrant is the Paralogisms section 
of the first Critique. In that section, Kant presents several different fourfold distinctions, but they are all 
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grounded in the first one (presented in the only section of the Paralogisms that was left unchanged in 
the second edition), where he analyzes what is entailed by the concept of a soul — i.e., the concept of a 
being who may be governed by law. I shall therefore take the table that appears at A344/B402 (together 
with the labels for each of the four features, provided in the paragraph immediately following the table) 
as the starting point for the set of 12 correlations to be examined in this article. I supplement that 
material by referring to aspects of each feature that Kant presents in his quite different explanations in 
the two separate versions of the Paralogisms that were written for the Critique’s two editions, especially 
the features described at A404 and B419.
Before examining how Kant’s theory of the fourfold nature of the soul correlates with the 
quaternity consisting of gua 47 ( ), 6 ( ), 58 ( ), and 10 ( ), we must note the important point 
that the middle two lines of all twelve of the gua to be considered in this article are identical. In each 
case, line three is broken and line four (immediately above it) is solid. These correspond to the “dark” 
and “light” forces in the symbolism of the Yijing; so we can say that for each of the twelve gua to be 
considered below, the light force is above the dark force. This relationship between the two central 
lines symbolizes governing and is precisely the reason that each gua considered here can be taken as 
having implications for a philosophy of law: law pertains in human society only when we are in a 
situation where light (e.g., rationality) is superimposed over darkness (e.g., our embodiment). The soul 
is therefore related to law in this sense: politics pertains to agreements between rational beings, whereby 
an intellectual (i.e., non-physical, “light”, soulful) principle is placed in a governing position over 
empirical (i.e., physical, “dark”, embodied) beings. As such, law can be regarded as the academic field 
that governs relations between embodied souls.
The first feature of the concept of a “soul”, according to Kant, is that it is a substance that 
is entirely non-material. This fundamental immateriality in our nature is what gives rise to the “I 
think” that we attach to all our knowledge, and that Descartes so infamously regarded as the basis 
for proving that the mind exists as a substance independent from the body. Kant elsewhere calls this 
“I think” transcendental apperception, arguing (contra Descartes) that it has absolutely no content and, 
indeed, cannot itself be an object of knowledge, for it consists of pure subjectivity. The second feature 
is the soul’s incorruptibility: that is, it is simple in the sense that we cannot divide a soul into parts; an 
individual cannot consist of multiple pure subjectivities. The third feature is what Kant calls personality, 
which he goes on to describe in terms of “unity in time”. In his moral writings, this is the feature of 
human nature that makes us responsible for our actions, but the point being made in the first Critique 
is more basic: because I am a “simple subject”, what happened to me ten years ago or what will happen 
to me ten years from now relates to the same “me” as is whatever happens to me today. Kant defines 
the fourth feature of the soul, its spirituality, in a rather surprising way: this feature refers not to the 
unrelatedness of a human being to the objects that inhabit the empirical world of physical nature, but 
to our relatedness to all possible objects in space. In other words, “spirituality” grounds us in space in 
the same way “personality” grounds us in time. Taken together, these two factors should make it more 
evident that Kant’s theory of the soul is not one that refers only to the “light” (rational) side of our 
nature, but one that refers to the fact that humans are “dark” (embodied) beings who are (or ought to 
be) governed by the “light” of rationality.
In attempting to correlate Kant’s account of the four features of the soul with the first quaternity in the yang-
yin quadrant of the Compound Yijing, the following map can serve as our guide:
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10: Treading [Conduct]
(Spirituality: related to possible spatial objects;
as identical subject in every thought-state)
         58: The Joyous [Lake]                               47: Oppression [Exhaustion]
             (Personality: unity in time;                       (Immateriality: substance;
as simple subject)                                 as the “I think”)
6: Conflict
(Incorruptibility: simple; as subject)
Figure 3: Kant’s Four Features of the Immortal Soul
This way of arranging the four relevant gua (like all the diagrams used in this article) follows 
the mapping rules that I defended in the second article in this series.8 It is based on a system of 
mapping that I call “the Geometry of Logic”, with lines 6 and 1 of each gua defining the fourfold 
logical relation that I normally represent using the four symbols: --, +-, -+, and ++ (see e.g., Lectures 
13-14 of Palmquist 2000b).
At first the feature of immateriality (i.e., the transcendental “I think”) seems totally unrelated 
to gua 47 ( ), “Oppression [Exhaustion]” (kun, 困), which appears in the first (i.e., the --) position 
of the first yang-yin quaternity. Detecting a correlation is particularly difficult, because the Yijing 
commentaries tend to focus on specific (often political) implications of each of the 64 ideal types of life-
situation, not on metaphysical theories of the soul. However, as is often the case when interpreting the 
Yijing, when we look more closely at the two trigrams that make up the hexagram, some interesting 
resonances do emerge. In this case, the “lake” trigram appears in the upper position, while the “water” 
trigram appears below it. The commentary starts by observing that “the lake is empty, dried up”, and 
that this represents “exhaustion” because “a dark line is holding down two light lines” (Yijing, 181). 
What is obvious from this symbolism, however, is that the empty (dry) condition of the lake is only 
temporary, since water wells up underneath it, as in an underground cavern. Thus, the Judgment states 
that, although “oppression” exists in the current situation, one who perseveres will achieve “success”. 
This insight on its own has nothing to do with the soul, yet we can observe a parallel symbolism that 
is present in Kant’s fourfold distinction. For the “I think” is exhausted or empty, when taken by itself; 
we can use it for the successful production of empirical knowledge in the world only when it remains 
connected to the empirical objects that appear to us in space and time. We can associate the lower 
trigram with the immaterial substance, the “I think”, that can breathe life (i.e., knowledge) into the 
otherwise lifeless (i.e., unknown) objects in the dry lake of the upper trigram, just as the water 
waits underground, ready to quench the dryness of the “oppressed” lake. The primary message of 
8  See note 4, above. The same rules govern the map corresponding to “Level Two” in Figure 2, above. A summary of  these 
rules is provided in the Appendix, below.
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the commentary on gua 47 is inner strength, even in times of adversity; likewise, there is no deeper 
source of a person’s interior nature in Kant’s philosophy than the “I think” — or “pure apperception”, 
as he sometimes called it. 
Occupying the second position on this first yang-yin quaternity, gua 6 ( ) is called “Conflict” 
(song, 訟) because the top trigram (“heaven”) tends upwards while and the bottom trigram (“water”) 
tends downwards (Yijing, 28). Again, this gua seems at first to highlight the very opposite of the 
corresponding component of Kant’s table, the soul’s incorruptibility. However, the entire commentary 
for gua 6 focuses on how to avoid conflict in situations involving competing forces; and given the 
soul’s embodiment, exactly the same situation applies to its second feature, the simplicity that makes it 
incorruptible. That is, physical bodies are not incorruptible, because they can be split apart — a topic 
with problems of its own, which Kant considers in the Second Antinomy (A434f/B462f ). But if the 
soul is to retain its fundamental features, it must take the wisdom of gua 6 into account, so that conflict 
(self-splitting) can be avoided.
Gua 58 ( ), “The Joyous [Lake]” (dui, 兌), is one of the eight hexagrams in the Yijing that is 
formed by repeating the same trigram twice: in this case, the trigram meaning “lake”. A lake under 
a lake gives rise to the joyous situation of water that does not easily dry up. Related to the human 
personality, the symbol (i.e., two solid lines, with a broken line on top — doubled) depicts the joy 
that arises out of “firmness and strength within, manifesting itself outwardly as yielding and gentle” 
(Yijing, 224). This can be taken as another way of saying that the essence of a person remains the 
same — i.e., the person experiences unity — when entering the realm of time, as occurs whenever 
we engage in social exchanges (a main theme of the commentary on this gua). Just as doubling a lake 
only makes it a greater lake, so also the soul retains its nature as a simple substance even when it 
relates to other souls, in time.
Finally, gua 10 ( ), “Treading [Conduct]” (lü, 履), implies a political situation where the 
strong are “treading” on the weak (Yijing, 44): the upper trigram (representing “heaven”) consists 
entirely of “light” lines, while the lower trigram (“lake”) has a “dark” line at the top, indicating a 
weaker role. The commentary emphasizes the inherent “difference of elevation” between heaven (the 
highest trigram symbol) and lake (the lowest), noting that the treading of the strong on the weak 
that is suggested by this symbolism “does not hurt the weak”, because it is done “in good humor” 
(Yijing, 45,44). Once again, the explicit focus on political relations in the Yijing commentary makes it 
somewhat difficult to see clear correlations between this gua and the corresponding feature in Kant’s 
theory of the soul. Nevertheless, a correlation emerges, once we realize that the spiritual nature of 
the soul is “heavenly” and the spatial nature of empirical objects is as “low” (i.e., empirical) as one can 
get; as such, gua 10 can indeed be regarded as a suitable symbolic depiction of the feature of the soul 
that requires it to be related to objects in space, as an absolute subject that presents itself as identical 
in each and every empirical relation.
The second yang-yin quaternity: the four “articles” leading to perpetual peace
Kant’s most influential publication that explicitly addresses political relations as such and in 
detail is his 1795 work, Toward Perpetual Peace. In this short book, Kant outlines his vision of the 
ultimate political situation (PP 349,354,357,368). As I have commented at some length on this work 
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elsewhere,9 I shall not attempt a discussion of the entire work here. Instead, it will suffice to provide 
a brief introduction to the four “articles” that form the architectonic backbone of his argument. 
Kant argues that, in order to put in place the conditions whereby peace between nations might 
come about, all nations (or at least, all those that submit to the system of international law that he 
envisions) must explicitly accept three “definitive articles” into their state constitution, and must 
implicitly adhere to a fourth, “secret article”. 
The first three articles are: (1) “The civil constitution of every state should be republican” (PP 
349); (2) “The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states” (PP 354); and (3) “The 
law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality” (PP 357).  That these 
three stand in a synthetic relationship (just like the first three gua shown on each cross in Figure 1), 
Kant explains in a footnote (PP 349n) that comes just before he introduces the first article, where 
he says “[e]very juridical constitution” must include three types of law: (1) “the civil law of men 
in a nation”; (2) “the law of nations in their relation to one another”; and (3) “the law of world 
citizenship” — i.e., “cosmopolitan” law. He then insists: “This division is not arbitrary”; indeed, (1) 
plays the role of the thesis (+), (2) functions as the antithesis (-) that limits the thesis, and (3) is the 
synthesis (x) that combines and transcends (1) and (2). Any nation that does not wish to remain in a 
“state of nature” (i.e., in a situation that is not governed by law) must graft each of these three types 
of law into its constitution.
Kant’s fourth (“secret”) article combines and confirms the ultimate purpose of the initial three: 
“The opinions of philosophers on the conditions of the possibility of public peace shall be consulted 
by those states armed for war” (PP 368). Since the ultimate purpose of any laws based on the first three 
articles is to pave the way for world peace, and because the articles as such (though not the specific laws 
that may be based on them) are philosophical articles, every state that genuinely hopes for peace must 
adopt the practice of consulting with philosophers if it seems that the laws are not succeeding in bring 
about the purpose of perpetual peace. It might seem that Kant is being ironic, in suggesting that this 
fourth article be “secret”; but I think his claim here should be taken quite seriously. Philosophers must 
remain separate from the actual implementation of public policies (i.e., their job is not to draft the 
actual laws that are based on each of the three definitive articles, but rather to tell the politicians what 
these fundamental principles themselves are), so the secrecy of their influence on the sovereign is a way 
of safeguarding their independence. That is, philosophers are to make themselves available to politicians, 
for consultation on crucial matters such as whether or not a war is necessary, but without making 
themselves part of the political system.  Bringing wisdom and impartiality to such considerations, good 
philosophers can guide kings (or anyone in a decision-making role) to reflect on whether there may be 
some alternative to war that would be more consistent with the three definitive articles.
Having briefly examined Kant’s theory of the ideal conditions for peaceful relations between 
human beings under the rule of law, let us now consider to what extent these conditions can be 
symbolized by the four gua in the second quaternity of the yang-yin quadrant of the Compound Yijing, 
as proposed in the second article in this series.
9  See Palmquist 2008; some relevant passages are also discussed in Palmquist 2005.
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21: Biting Through 
(secret article:  consult philosophers before going to war)
     
  51: The Arousing (Shock, Thunder)                     16: Enthusiasm
                                    (third article:                        (first article:
                         universal hospitality)                                republican constitution) 
    
35: Progress
(second article:  federalism of free states)
Figure 4: Kant’s Four Articles for Peaceful Political Constitutions
As the second quaternity in the yang-yin quadrant, these four gua function as the direct antithesis to 
those that make up the first quaternity. Whereas the first quaternity deals with what must be presupposed 
in order for law to arise in the first place (i.e., the human soul, as an individual reality), this second quaternity 
aims to make explicit the types of law that should govern the ideal relations between different human beings, 
when we come together in groups. As the Yijing commentaries are explicitly oriented toward political 
applications of the 64 gua, identifying relevant correlations in this case will be considerably easier than in the 
previous quaternity. 
Gua 16 ( ), “Enthusiasm” (yu, 豫), corresponds to the requirement made by Kant’s first 
definitive article, that the civil constitution of every (peaceful) state “should be republican” (PP 349). 
By this, Kant means that the consent of the people must be obtained in order for them to be required 
to submit to national law. In other words, the people must agree to be governed by the set of laws that 
their government institutes. This first gua expresses this requirement symbolically, by depicting one 
solid line, at the base of the top trigram, with all other lines being broken or “weak” — in the sense of 
being obedient or compliant. The text interprets this one solid line in gua 16 as representing “the leading 
official” (Yijing, 67) who inspires “obedience and devotion” in all who are under that person’s authority; 
as such, the gua as a whole represents “the law for natural events and for human life.” When it comes to 
relations between citizens of a nation, this is precisely what Kant refers to as a republican constitution. 
In other words, whereas the one strong line in ancient Chinese society represented the emperor or one 
of his “leading officials”, that same role is filled in modern nation-states by the republican constitution. 
All who live in the nation must enthusiastically comply.
The next component of this second quaternity is gua 35 ( ), “Progress” (jin, 晉), and corresponds 
to an international situation that in Kant’s day could only be hoped for. Kant looks forward to a day 
when relations between nation-states would progress to the point where each nation allowed itself 
to be governed by a higher law, in the same way that citizens in nation-states had already become 
accustomed to being governed by a national law by the late nineteenth century: just as citizens agree 
to be bound by and enthusiastically obedient to their nation’s constitution, so also groups of nations 
must agree to be bound by and obedient to international law — this being the true mark of progress on 
Twelve Basic Concepts of Law in Kant and the Compound Yijing
120        Modernos & Contemporâneos, Campinas, v. 1, n. 1., jan./jun., 2017.
the road to world peace. Along these lines, the Yijing commentary (Yijing, 136) interprets gua 35 as 
picturing “a time when a powerful feudal lord rallies the other lords around the sovereign and pledges 
fealty and peace.” Again, the context for interpreting this symbolism was very different in ancient 
China, so we cannot expect it to be expressed in terms that correspond exactly to Kant’s; nevertheless, 
the parallel here is remarkable. Just as the second step in Kant’s four-step path to peace requires the 
sovereign of each nation to give way to a higher, international law, so also gua 35 depicts peace as 
coming only when lower-level rulers give up some of their power in mutual obedience to a higher 
political authority. The gua symbolizes precisely this type of progress by depicting the fourth line 
(representing the nation’s sovereign in Kant’s day, or the feudal lord in ancient China) as remaining in 
place (just as in gua 16), while an additional strong line (an additional law) has been added at the very 
top — one that governs all relations that fall under it.
Gua 51 ( ), called “The Arousing (Shock, Thunder)” (zhen, 震), corresponds to Kant’s third 
definitive article, whereby cosmopolitan law is “limited to conditions of universal hospitality” (PP 
357). The arousing shock that gives this gua its name is derived from the fact that the trigrams are 
identical (like the two that form gua 58, in the third position of the first quaternity in this yang-yin 
quadrant), both representing thunder. The main feature of this gua (aside from the repetition of the 
trigram, suggesting that thunder echoes throughout the land) is that the solid line that was at the 
top of the previous gua has now moved to the very bottom, to line 1. While it is possible to see this 
as symbolizing a coup d’etat, as the Yijing suggests,10 it can also be taken to represent the need to 
be inwardly prepared for any such shocking external events: in response to the “fear and trembling” 
aroused by the shock of a double bolt of thunder (Yijing, 198), “The superior man sets his life in order 
/ And examines himself.” The deepest symbolism here is that, whereas the previous gua highlighted 
the need for an external (international) law, in order for peace between nations to occur, this gua 
highlights the need for inner peace through the rule of the law of love in one’s heart: and this is the 
essence of what Kant calls “hospitality”. It is important to note that Kant’s third article does not 
command hospitality as such; rather, it requires nations to protect the conditions for hospitality by law. 
What prevents most people from being hospitable, especially in their relations with people from 
foreign countries, is the inner fear that is aroused at the thought of the shock that such persons might 
bring to one’s comfortable lifestyle. This third gua, just like Kant’s third definitive article, requires the 
“superior man” — cf. the constitution of a peace-loving state — to prepare for the shocks that may 
occur as a result of openness to foreign influence.
Finally, gua 21 ( ), entitled “Biting Through” (shihe, 噬嗑), corresponds to the “secret article” 
whereby any ruler who is preparing for war must consult philosophers for guidance (PP 368). 
This gua combines all key elements of the previous three, in the sense that it includes all strong 
lines that appeared in any of the other three gua in this quaternity: the strong line in the fourth 
position (representing the republican constitution), the strong line in the sixth position (representing 
international law), and the strong line in the first position (representing the internal readiness to be 
hospitable) all come together at this point. As such, the three solid and three broken lines in this gua 
aptly symbolize the philosopher’s awareness of and expertise in all three definitive articles. Similarly, 
the Yijing commentary relates this gua to a situation where one must have “recourse to law” (Yijing, 86) 
10 Thus, the commentary in the English translation (Yijing, 197) takes the symbolism of each trigram of gua 51 to represent 
“the eldest son, who seizes rule with energy and power.”
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in order to overcome “the disturbances of harmonious social life caused by criminals and slanderers.” 
The name for this gua comes from the image of the upper trigram, which looks like an open mouth, 
whose two lips are prevented from coming together by some obstruction. The advice given in the 
“judgment” is that “biting through” will bring “success” (Yijing, 86): “It is favorable to let justice be 
administered.” This upper trigram is also the symbol for “fire” (or in this context, “lightening”), so the 
“shock” presented by the previous gua is now being balanced by a legal response (e.g., punishment for a 
crime) in this gua. While this might seem at first to be an invitation to war if the perceived wrong-doer 
is a foreign nation, in the context of international law it is rather an invitation to seek guidance from 
the “judge” who established the definitive articles — i.e., to let philosophers advise the sovereign whether 
war is justified in the current situation.
The third yang-yin quaternity: the four objective relations of law to duty 
We have now seen that, whereas the first of the three Kantian quaternities under consideration 
in this article seemed only indirectly reflected by the four corresponding gua in the Compound Yijing, 
the second Kantian quaternity turned out to correspond very closely to the symbolic meanings raised 
in the Yijing’s discussion of the four relevant gua.  The remaining task is to examine the table that Kant 
presents near the end of the Introduction to his 1797 book, Metaphysic of Morals, in order to determine 
the extent to which the four objective relations that he there portrays as holding between law and duty 
(see MM 240) are in any way symbolically reflected by the corresponding gua in the third quaternity of 
the yang-yin quadrant of the Compound Yijing. As usual, I shall begin with a brief account of Kant’s 
fourfold distinction, then examine each potential correlation one by one.
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals (1797), one of his last published works, was intended to fulfill a 
synthetic function in the architectonic plan of the practical wing of his philosophical system.11 Its two 
main parts, on right and virtue, examine the laws governing groups of people in political situations and 
the laws governing individuals in ethical situations, respectively. Since the former corresponds to the 
political theory presented (in its ideal form) in Perpetual Peace and the latter to the rational theory of the 
soul presented in the Dialectic of the first Critique, the synthetic function of this late book can best be seen 
in a table that includes both the external (group) and the internal (individual) aspects of Kant’s concern. 
This is precisely what we find in Kant’s table, entitled “Division in Accordance with the Objective 
Relation of Law to Duty” (MM 240). Here Kant applies two dyadic distinctions to each other, with each 
of the resulting four elements relating to both duty and law: either “perfect” or “imperfect” laws/duties; 
and laws/duties that relate either “to Oneself ” or “to Others”. The resulting quaternity defines the four 
possible ways of relating law to duty. A law can express: (1) “The right of humanity in our own person”; 
(2) “The right of human beings” in general; (3) “The end of humanity in our own person”; or (4) “The 
end of human beings” in general. The first two are externally-oriented (legal), while both members of the 
second pair are internally-oriented (ethical).
We can now summarize the proposed correlations between Kant’s theory of the four possible 
relations of law to duty and the four gua that appear in the third quaternity of the yang-yin quadrant 
of the Compound Yijing in terms of the following diagram.
11 For a detailed account and justification of this claim, see Palmquist 1986, revised and republished as                                     Chap-
ter III in Palmquist 1993.
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25: Innocence (The Unexpected) 
(End of human beings:  imperfect duty to others)
    
                          17: Following                              45: Gathering Together [Massing]
             (End of humanity in oneself:                       (Right of humanity in oneself:
                  imperfect duty to oneself )                                 perfect duty to oneself ) 
    
12: Standstill [Stagnation]
(Right of human beings: perfect duty to others)
Figure 5: Kant’s Four Relations of Law to Duty (as Right or End)
As above, I shall consider each of these proposed correlations in turn, to assess whether the 
type of law designated by each of these four classifications resonates in any way with the symbolism 
presented in the commentary for the corresponding gua. As usual, we obviously must not expect the 
text of the Yijing to present Kant’s theory as such; rather, we are looking for symbolic features of the 
main hexagram, its two component trigrams, and/or the individual six lines that had implications, in 
the minds of those who wrote the text of the Yijing, similar to those Kant had in mind for the relevant 
type of legal relation. An important point to note at this point is that this quaternity consists of the 
only four gua that have two solid lines above two broken lines in the central four positions (i.e., in lines 
2-5). This suggests that each gua will depict a sharp contrast between the phenomenal (the external, 
“solid” side of human nature) and the noumenal (the internal, “broken” side) — the very contrast that 
Kant himself highlights in the paragraph just before he introduces his fourfold distinction.
 Gua 45 ( ), called “Gathering Together [Massing]” (cui, 萃), starts off this final quaternity of the 
yang-yin quadrant with a symbol that, according to my proposal, should correlate to the legal rights people 
have, as a result of the fact that each person has a “perfect duty to oneself ” (MM 240). The name for this gua 
comes from the fact that it consists of two trigrams that represent a lake on top, and the earth underneath: 
hence, the image is of water gathering where it should, but with the ever-present danger of overflowing 
(Yijing, 175): “Precautions must be taken to prevent this.” Due to the military concerns that dominated the 
authors of the Yijing, a situation characterized by “gathering together” (Yijing, 175) will be one in which “we 
must arm promptly to ward off the unexpected.” However, an internal, moral application is also given: when 
people are gathering together, “strife is likely to arise” (Yijing, 175), and the leader must therefore “first of all be 
collected within himself.” Just as Kant claims that the collective recognition of human rights is the starting-
point for realizing one’s perfect duty to oneself, so also the Yijing makes a surprisingly similar claim at this 
point (Yijing, 175): “Only collective moral force can unite the world.” Law is grounded in our awareness of 
what we owe to ourselves, as human. Only on this basis can we accurately judge when one person needs to 
be punished for causing the boundaries of the social “lake” to overflow.
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 Next, gua 12 ( ), entitled “Standstill [Stagnation]” (pi, 否), should correlate with Kant’s 
theory of the legal rights human beings have as such, as a result of the fact that each person has a perfect 
duty to others. This gua is ominous, as its two trigrams, representing heaven (three unbroken lines) on 
top and earth (three broken lines) on the bottom, symbolically point in opposite directions (Yijing, 52): 
“The creative powers are not in relation.” However, such times of potential “disintegration” (Yijing, 55) 
are precisely the reason that modern nation-states need laws, according to Kant’s theory. Just as “the 
great man calmly bears the consequences of the standstill” (Yijing, 54), when such seemingly absolute 
political oppositions occur, so also Kant’s political theory requires that laws be implemented to protect 
those who are in danger of being harmed during times of transition, when “[w]eakness is within, 
harshness without” (Yijing, 53). In other words, Kant’s solution to the problem being faced, when 
gua 12 applies to a situation and those who hold political power are not moral (so that “the superior 
people” can “remain faithful to their principles” only by “withdraw[ing] into seclusion” [Yijing, 53]), is 
to implement laws that protect those whose human rights are being violated by the “standstill”.
 Gua 17 ( ), called “Following” (sui, 隨), should correspond to Kant’s theory of the end (or 
purpose) of humanity in oneself, and this ethical end arises out of the imperfect duty that all human 
persons have to themselves. The image formed by the two trigrams symbolizes “Thunder in the middle 
of the lake” (Yijing, 72), which in turn conjures up the notion of “following”— not in the sense of the 
“superior man” following others, but rather in the sense of attracting a following. The only way to attract 
a following, the text suggests, is by doing the right thing, in service to others (Yijing, 72): “If a man 
would rule, he must first learn to serve; for only in this way does he secure from those below him the 
joyous assent that is necessary if they are to follow him.” While such service might seem at first to 
be closer to what Kant has in mind by the fourth element in his quaternity (i.e., “imperfect duty to 
others”) than to the third element (“imperfect duty to oneself ”), upon closer examination we can see 
that the focus of this gua is in fact on self-development. That is, the ultimate goal of the value that is 
depicted by gua 17 is not service to others, but rather developing oneself into the sort of person that 
others will want to emulate. As such, the proposed correlation once again fits very well.
 Finally, gua 25 ( ), entitled “Innocence (The Unexpected)” (wuwang, 無妄), is constructed out 
of trigrams representing “heaven” on top and “thunder” (or “movement”) below. The name stems from 
the idea that, “[w]hen…movement follows the law of heaven, man is innocent” (Yijing 100). Relating the 
resulting image of spontaneous innocence to good governance (as usual), the text interprets the image as 
follows (Yijing 101): “Thus the kings of old, / Rich in virtue, and in harmony with the time, / Fostered 
and nourished all beings.” In contrast to the previous gua in this quaternity, the focus of the movement 
in question here is precisely what Kant’s fourfold distinction leads us to expect: our imperfect duty to 
foster the ends of other human beings. In other words, just as Kant’s virtuous person has a duty not 
only to develop his or her own talents but also to foster the ends of others (i.e., to work toward other 
people’s happiness as well as one’s own), so also the Yijing here insists that one whose self-development 
has earned him the right to be a leader must also use his power as king to foster the self-development of 
all under his governance. Once again, the correlation here is truly remarkable, given the lack of evidence 
that the Yijing had any historical influence on Kant’s thinking. The only plausible explanation, as I 
suggested in the second article in this series (see Palmquist 2012b, 190), is that both Kant and the Yijing 
are appealing to the same architectonic structure that naturally informs the way human beings form 
systematic distinctions.
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 In conclusion, let me highlight the significance of the observation made in the third article in 
this series, that Kant’s emphasis throughout his application of architectonic reasoning is on identifying 
transcendental truths that establish the boundary-conditions for each realm of human experience 
under consideration, to the (apparent, but not actual) exclusion of hypothetical reasoning, whereas the 
Yijing’s emphasis is on the latter to the (apparent, but not actual) exclusion of the former. Those who 
fail to recognize the architectonic nature of the Yijing, but who instead treat it as a system providing 
the type of knowledge that Kant calls “aggregate” (i.e., knowledge based on generalization from 
observed experiences), inevitably tend to employ the ancient system in a superstitious way, such that it 
ceases to have any serious philosophical value. One who consults the Yijing with the latter outcome in 
mind does so not in order to gain wisdom but in order to gain information. My approach to the Yijing 
in this series of articles reverses this trend, and in so doing treats the Yijing as a philosophical text 
whose appearance of randomness can serve as a helpful counterbalance to the appearance of absolute 
necessity that Kant gives his readers. 
Herein lies the key to a proper understanding of the correlations I have suggested between 
Kant and the Compound Yijing: I have sought parallel relations, not relations of exact identity. When 
philosophers adopt an architectonic approach of the Kantian (transcendental) variety, the results of 
their inquiry should be necessary and universal; to search for a feature of Kant’s architectonic that could 
be otherwise (i.e., a feature that might somehow change) would be a hopeless cause. One does not 
understand what “transcendental” means, if one asks how it might change, for what is transcendental 
is the changeless pattern that we must read onto our experience in order to have it at all. Likewise, 
one would misunderstand what “hypothetical” means, if one were to ask for a feature of the Yijing’s 
architectonic that could not be otherwise (i.e., a feature of the 64-gua system that could never change 
into some other feature of the same system). Just as the whole point of interpreting the Yijing is 
that it is always hypothetical and is therefore constantly subject to change, so also the whole point of 
interpreting Kant’s philosophical system is that it is always transcendental and is therefore never subject 
to change. Yet, the two systems accomplish these opposite (i.e., complementary) goals by applying an 
architectonic method that is another sense virtually identical: each produces its respective system by 
imposing a predetermined formal/mathematical pattern onto the object under consideration, rather 
than reading the pattern off of the object. This, as I have demonstrated above, makes their conclusions 
surprisingly amenable to analogical correlation. So much so, that it raises anew the age-old question of 
Heraclitus: whether there is any essential difference between change and the changeless.
Appendix: 
Mapping Rules Used in Applying the Geometry of Logic to the Compound Yijing 
1.  The core quaternity of the Compound Yijing consists of the four most extreme gua: first two 
(perfectly “pure”) gua and the last two (perfectly “mixed”) gua.
2.  Lines 3 and 4 of each gua within the same quadrant remain fixed and thus serve to identify all 
16 gua that are located on levels 2-4 of that quadrant.
3.  Positions of the gua on each of the four triads that make up the third level are derived from 
the corresponding second-level gua by changing first its top line (to define the “thesis” gua), 
then changing its bottom line (to define the “antithesis” gua), then changing both its top and 
bottom lines (to define the “synthesis” gua).
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4.  The variation in lines 1 and 6 of each gua determines the position where each gua is placed 
on its cross: regardless of where a cross appears in the overall system, yang (+) is always placed 
above and to the left of yin (-), so that the order (moving clockwise from the 3 o’clock position 
to the 12 o’clock position) is always --, +-, -+, ++.
5.  On the fourth level, lines 2 and 5 in each gua distinguish the three quaternities in a given 
quadrant from the other two quaternities in that quadrant. To derive these lines from the 
relevant third-level gua (i.e., from the gua positioned closest to the relevant fourth-level 
quaternity), compare that gua with the second-level gua in the same quadrant. If line 2 and/
or line 5 changes, when moving from the second level to the third, that/those line(s) remain(s) 
unchanged for each of the four gua in the relevant fourth-level quaternity; if line 2 and/or 
line 5 remain(s) unchanged, that/those line(s) will change for each fourth-level gua in that 
quaternity.
References
HERSHOCK, P. D.  2009, “The Structure of Change in the Yijing «易經»,” in Philosophy of the Yi 
易: Unity and Dialectics, Supplement to Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36 (December): 48-72.
KANT, I. 1797, Metaphysics of Morals (1797), tr. Mary J. Gregor in Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 363-603. Abbreviated “MM”, with page references citing 
the German (Academy Edition), volume 6.
______.1795, Perpetual Peace, tr. Lewis White Beck in Immanuel Kant, On History, ed. L.W. Beck 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1963): 85-135. Abbreviated “PP”, with page 
references citing the German (Academy Edition), volume 8.
_____.1781/1787, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996). References 
cite the relevant pagination of the “A” and/or B” editions. 
PALMqUIST, S. R. 2014, “Twelve Basic Philosophical Concepts in Kant and the Compound Yijing”, 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 41 (forthcoming).
______.2013, “A Daoist Model for a Kantian Church”, Comparative Philosophy 4.1 (January): 67-89.
______.2012b, “Mapping Kant’s Architectonic onto the Yijing via the Geometry of Logic”, Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 39 Supplement (December): 68-86.
______.2012a, “Analytic Aposteriority and its Relevance to Twentieth Century Philosophy”, Studia 
Humana 1.3/4: 3-16.
______.2010, “The Unity of Architectonic Reasoning in Kant and I Ching”, in Cultivating Personhood: 
Kant and Asian Philosophy, ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), pp.811-821; 
revised and republished as “Architectonic Reasoning and Interpretation in Kant and Yijing”, 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (December 2011): 569-583.
______.2008, “The Philosopher as a ‘Secret Agent’ for Peace: Taking Seriously Kant’s Revival of the 
‘Old question’”, in Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra and Guido A. de Almeida (eds.), Recht 
und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants, vol. 4 of Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), 597-608.
______.2005, “Kant’s Ideal of the University as a Model for World Peace”, in Papers of International 
Conference on Two Hundred Years after Kant (Tehran, Iran: Allame Tabataba’i University Press), 
207- 222.
Twelve Basic Concepts of Law in Kant and the Compound Yijing
126        Modernos & Contemporâneos, Campinas, v. 1, n. 1., jan./jun., 2017.
______. 2000b, The Tree of Philosophy. (Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press); First edition, 1992.
______. 2000a,  Kant’s Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s System of Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate).
______.1993, Kant’s System of Perspectives: An architectonic interpretation of the Critical Philosophy 
(Lanham: University Press of America).
______.1986. “The Architectonic Form of Kant’s Copernican Logic”, Metaphilosophy, 17:4 (October): 266-
288.
WILHELM, R; CARY F. B. (trans.) 1968, I Ching or Book of Changes, tr. Richard Wilhelm and Cary 
F. Baynes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 181.
Revista digital: www.ifch.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/modernoscontemporaneos
